Schellenberg's Noseeum Assumption about Nonresistant Nonbelief
In this article, I outline a strategy for challenging J.L. Schellenberg's hiddenness argument, and specifically the premise within the argument that asserts the existence of what Schellenberg calls nonresistant nonbelief. Drawing on some of the philosophical resources of skeptical theism, I sh...
| Published in: | European journal for philosophy of religion |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
2021
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2021, Volume: 13, Issue: 3, Pages: 139-156 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Schellenberg, J. L. 1959-, Divine hiddenness and human reason
/ Unbelief
/ Existence of God
/ Argumantation
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| RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NBC Doctrine of God |
| Further subjects: | B
hiddenness argument
B Skeptical theism |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | In this article, I outline a strategy for challenging J.L. Schellenberg's hiddenness argument, and specifically the premise within the argument that asserts the existence of what Schellenberg calls nonresistant nonbelief. Drawing on some of the philosophical resources of skeptical theism, I show how this premise is based on a particular "noseeum assumption" - what I call Schellenberg's Noseeum Assumption - that underwrites a particular "noseeum argument." This assumption is that, regarding putative nonresistant nonbelievers, more likely than not we'd detect these nonbelievers' resistance toward God if there were any. I give reasons for thinking that it is not more reasonable to affirm than to refrain from affirming Schellenberg's Noseeum Assumption, and so reason to think that the hiddenness argument is not a good argument for atheism. I also defend the strategy I outline against several objections. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.2021.3085 |