A Moral Fine-Tuning Argument
This paper develops Mark D. Linville’s brief description of “a sort of moral fine-tuning argument”. I develop the argument in four ways: I unpack the argument and give it a clear formulation, I unpack the theistic explanation of why a somewhat reliable moral capacity is expected, I point to the sign...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
MDPI
2024
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In: |
Religions
Year: 2024, Volume: 15, Issue: 1 |
Further subjects: | B
Non-naturalism
B theistic argument B Natural Theology B Metaethics B Moral Argument B Fine-tuning argument |
Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
Summary: | This paper develops Mark D. Linville’s brief description of “a sort of moral fine-tuning argument”. I develop the argument in four ways: I unpack the argument and give it a clear formulation, I unpack the theistic explanation of why a somewhat reliable moral capacity is expected, I point to the significance of not seeking to explain a perfect moral capacity, and I put the argument up against the recent work on non-theistic moral epistemology by Derek Parfit, David Enoch, and Erik Wielenberg. |
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ISSN: | 2077-1444 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Religions
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.3390/rel15010031 |