Pragmatic decisions about god from different points of view: the costs of apostasy
Pascal, with his famous wager, argued in favour of religious practice and faith by appeal to expected payoffs. Here I discuss an asymmetry in similar pragmatic arguments for decisions about God. I begin with the observation that apostates (those who abandon religious practice and/or belief) pay cost...
| Publié dans: | International journal for philosophy of religion |
|---|---|
| Auteur principal: | |
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2016]
|
| Dans: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2016, Volume: 80, Numéro: 2, Pages: 103-113 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Bereavement
B BELIEF & doubt B Pascal B Apostasy B God B Wager B Pragmatics |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | Pascal, with his famous wager, argued in favour of religious practice and faith by appeal to expected payoffs. Here I discuss an asymmetry in similar pragmatic arguments for decisions about God. I begin with the observation that apostates (those who abandon religious practice and/or belief) pay costs not shared by those who never adopt a religion in the first place. Noticing this asymmetry shows these arguments from a new perspective and may also contribute to an explanation of the endurance of religion. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-015-9555-9 |