The Sources of Scepticism
It is claimed that the radical sceptical problem that is the focus of much of contemporary epistemological discussion in fact divides into two logically distinct sub-problems—a formulation that turns on the closure principle and a second formulation which turns on the underdetermination principle. T...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2016
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| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2016, Volume: 6, Issue: 2/3, Pages: 203-227 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Cognition theory
/ Disjunction (Logic) (Logic)
/ Logical conclusion
/ Scepticism
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| Further subjects: | B
Belief
closure
epistemological disjunctivism
hinge commitments
knowledge
perception
scepticism
underdetermination
Wittgenstein
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| Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
| Summary: | It is claimed that the radical sceptical problem that is the focus of much of contemporary epistemological discussion in fact divides into two logically distinct sub-problems—a formulation that turns on the closure principle and a second formulation which turns on the underdetermination principle. The Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation is set out, and it is shown how this proposal—at least when properly formulated—can deal with closure-based radical scepticism. It is also claimed, however, that this account fails to gain any purchase on underdetermination-based radical scepticism. The antidote to this latter form of radical scepticism lies elsewhere—with, it is suggested, epistemological disjunctivism. |
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| Physical Description: | Online-Ressource |
| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Contains: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-00603008 |