How to reject Benatar's asymmetry argument
In this article I reconsider David Benatar's primary argument for anti-natalism—the asymmetry argument—and outline a three-step process for rejecting it. I begin in Part 2 by reconstructing the asymmetry argument into three main premises. I then turn in Parts 3-5 to explain how each of these pr...
| Auteur principal: | |
|---|---|
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Wiley-Blackwell
[2019]
|
| Dans: |
Bioethics
Année: 2019, Volume: 33, Numéro: 6, Pages: 674-683 |
| RelBib Classification: | NBE Anthropologie NCA Éthique VA Philosophie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
procreative ethics
B quality of life argument B Anti-natalism B David Benatar B asymmetry argument |
| Accès en ligne: |
Accès probablement gratuit Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | In this article I reconsider David Benatar's primary argument for anti-natalism—the asymmetry argument—and outline a three-step process for rejecting it. I begin in Part 2 by reconstructing the asymmetry argument into three main premises. I then turn in Parts 3-5 to explain how each of these premises is in fact false. Finally, I conclude in Part 6 by considering the relationship between the asymmetry argument and the quality of life argument in Benatar's overall case for anti-natalism and argue that it is the latter argument that is actually doing the work. In this sense, the asymmetry argument is not only unsuccessful in generating Benatar's anti-natalist conclusion, it is also unnecessary as well. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12582 |