Knowledge without “Experience”

Genia Schönbaumsfeld argues that Cartesian skepticism is an illusion induced by the “Cartesian Picture” of perceptual knowledge, in which knowledge of the “external world” depends on an inference from how things subjectively seem to one to how they actually are. To show its incoherence, she draws on...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. VerfasserIn: Williams, Michael 1947- (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
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Veröffentlicht: Brill 2021
In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Jahr: 2021, Band: 11, Heft: 2, Seiten: 119-142
normierte Schlagwort(-folgen):B Schönbaumsfeld, Genia 1973-, The illusion of doubt / Erkenntnistheorie / McDowell, John Henry 1942-, Mind and world / Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1889-1951, Über Gewissheit / Cartesianismus
RelBib Classification:AB Religionsphilosophie; Religionskritik; Atheismus
VA Philosophie
weitere Schlagwörter:B Cartesian skepticism
B Perception
B Knowledge
B Wittgenstein
B McDowell
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Zusammenfassung:Genia Schönbaumsfeld argues that Cartesian skepticism is an illusion induced by the “Cartesian Picture” of perceptual knowledge, in which knowledge of the “external world” depends on an inference from how things subjectively seem to one to how they actually are. To show its incoherence, she draws on the work of John McDowell, which she sees as elaborating a central theme from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty . I argue that Cartesian skepticism is not an illusion, as Schönbaumsfeld understands ‘illusion’, and that McDowell’s account of perceptual knowledge is both untenable and incompatible with Wittgenstein’s ideas about knowledge. Schönbaumsfeld thinks that, to understand how perception can engender knowledge of the world, we need a non-Cartesian account of perceptual reasons. Wittgenstein offers a much more radical break with the Cartesian Picture: an account of knowledge without ‘experience’.
ISSN:2210-5700
Enthält:Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20201425