Response to: divine responsibility without divine freedom

Michael Bergmann and Jan Cover summarize the essence of their paper as follows: “We argue that divine responsibility is sufficient for divine thankworthiness and consistent with the absence of divine freedom. We do this while insisting on the view that both freedom and responsibility are incompatibl...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International journal for philosophy of religion
Main Author: Rowe, William L. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2010
In: International journal for philosophy of religion
Further subjects:B Perfectly good
B Brute necessity
B Thankworthy
B Responsible
B Freedom
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
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Parallel Edition:Electronic
Description
Summary:Michael Bergmann and Jan Cover summarize the essence of their paper as follows: “We argue that divine responsibility is sufficient for divine thankworthiness and consistent with the absence of divine freedom. We do this while insisting on the view that both freedom and responsibility are incompatible with causal determinism.” In this response I argue that while it makes sense for believers to be thankful that God exists, it makes no sense for them to thank him for doing the best act he can, given the circumstances.
ISSN:1572-8684
Contains:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-009-9212-2