The virtues of belief: toward a non-evidentialist ethics of belief-formation
William Kingdon Clifford famously argued that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” His ethics of belief can be construed as involving two distinct theses—a moral claim (that it is wrong to hold beliefs to which one is not entitled) and an...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2008
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| Dans: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2008, Volume: 63, Numéro: 1, Pages: 25-37 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Ethics of belief
B Doxastic voluntarism B Evidentialism B Belief-formation B Self-deception B Clifford B Virtue Ethics |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Édition parallèle: | Électronique
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| Résumé: | William Kingdon Clifford famously argued that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” His ethics of belief can be construed as involving two distinct theses—a moral claim (that it is wrong to hold beliefs to which one is not entitled) and an epistemological claim (that entitlement is always a function of evidential support). Although I reject the (universality of the) epistemological claim, I argue that something deserving of the name ethics of belief can nevertheless be preserved. However, in the second half of the paper I argue that Clifford’s response to the problem of unethical belief is insufficiently attentive to the role played by self-deception in the formation of unethical beliefs. By contrasting the first-person perspective of a doxastic agent with the third-person perspective of an outside observer, I argue that unethical belief is a symptom of deficiencies of character: fix these, and belief will fix itself. I suggest that the moral intuitions implicit in our response to examples of unethical belief (like Clifford’s famous example of the ship owner) can better be accounted for in terms of a non-evidentialist virtue ethics of belief-formation, and that such an account can survive the rejection of strong versions of doxastic voluntarism., It is as easy to close the eyes of the mind as those of the body: and the former is more frequently done with willfulness, and yet not attended to, than the latter; the actions of the mind being more quick and transient, than those of the senses., Joseph Butler, “Upon Self-Deceit” (1726) |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-007-9139-4 |