Belief and the Error Theory

A new kind of debate about the normative error theory has emerged. Whereas longstanding debates have fixed on the error theory’s plausibility, this new debate concerns the theory’s believability. Bart Streumer (2013) is the chief proponent of the error theory’s unbelievability. In this brief essay,...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs: Forcehimes, Andrew T. (Auteur) ; Talisse, Robert B. 1970- (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2016]
Dans: Ethical theory and moral practice
Année: 2016, Volume: 19, Numéro: 4, Pages: 849-856
RelBib Classification:NCA Éthique
VA Philosophie
Sujets non-standardisés:B Belief Formation
B Error Theory
B Reasons
B Bart Streumer
B Belief Maintenance
Accès en ligne: Volltext (Verlag)
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Description
Résumé:A new kind of debate about the normative error theory has emerged. Whereas longstanding debates have fixed on the error theory’s plausibility, this new debate concerns the theory’s believability. Bart Streumer (2013) is the chief proponent of the error theory’s unbelievability. In this brief essay, we argue that Streumer’s argument prevails against extant critiques, and then press a criticism of our own.
ISSN:1572-8447
Contient:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-016-9707-8