A Sellarsian Transcendental Argument against External World Skepticism

Abstract This paper investigates the relation between what James Conant has called Kantian and Cartesian varieties of skepticism. It is argued that a solution to the most prominent example of a Kantian variety of skepticism, i.e. Kripkensteinian skepticism about rule-following and meaning, can be fo...

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Publié dans:International journal for the study of skepticism
Auteur principal: Geier, Marin (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Brill 2021
Dans: International journal for the study of skepticism
Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés:B Sellars, Wilfrid 1912-1989 / Transzendentales Argument / Kant, Immanuel 1724-1804 / Scepticisme / Cartésianisme
RelBib Classification:AB Philosophie de la religion
VA Philosophie
Sujets non-standardisés:B Cartesian skepticism
B Wilfrid Sellars
B transcendental arguments
B Kantian skepticism
B Rule-following
B meaning skepticism
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Résumé:Abstract This paper investigates the relation between what James Conant has called Kantian and Cartesian varieties of skepticism. It is argued that a solution to the most prominent example of a Kantian variety of skepticism, i.e. Kripkensteinian skepticism about rule-following and meaning, can be found in the works of Wilfrid Sellars. It is then argued that, on the basis of that very same solution to the Kantian problematic of rule-following and meaning, a novel argument against external world skepticism can be formulated. This argument takes the shape of a transcendental argument, which is reminiscent of Hilary Putnam’s infamous argument against the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, but is, as is argued, superior to it in certain respects.
ISSN:2210-5700
Contient:Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20201365