A Sellarsian Transcendental Argument against External World Skepticism
Abstract This paper investigates the relation between what James Conant has called Kantian and Cartesian varieties of skepticism. It is argued that a solution to the most prominent example of a Kantian variety of skepticism, i.e. Kripkensteinian skepticism about rule-following and meaning, can be fo...
Publié dans: | International journal for the study of skepticism |
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Auteur principal: | |
Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Brill
2021
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Dans: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
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Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Sellars, Wilfrid 1912-1989
/ Transzendentales Argument
/ Kant, Immanuel 1724-1804
/ Scepticisme
/ Cartésianisme
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RelBib Classification: | AB Philosophie de la religion VA Philosophie |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Cartesian skepticism
B Wilfrid Sellars B transcendental arguments B Kantian skepticism B Rule-following B meaning skepticism |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Résumé: | Abstract This paper investigates the relation between what James Conant has called Kantian and Cartesian varieties of skepticism. It is argued that a solution to the most prominent example of a Kantian variety of skepticism, i.e. Kripkensteinian skepticism about rule-following and meaning, can be found in the works of Wilfrid Sellars. It is then argued that, on the basis of that very same solution to the Kantian problematic of rule-following and meaning, a novel argument against external world skepticism can be formulated. This argument takes the shape of a transcendental argument, which is reminiscent of Hilary Putnam’s infamous argument against the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, but is, as is argued, superior to it in certain respects. |
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ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20201365 |